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ABSTRACT
Visual mental imagery protocols can provide step-by-step
traces of executive decisionmaking. Sequences of drawings
that externalize thought processes are often easier to analyze
than transcriptions of tape recorded verbal protocols. The
technique is of obvious use for investigating spatial problem
solving behavior since such tasks are usually solved with
sketches, drawings, or graphs; the methodology is also
appropriate for abstract, non-spatial decisionmaking for whichmental images often function as models that managers mentally
construct and manipulate. This paper reports an application
to the analysis of decisions by a high level executive: the
commander of a naval task force. The study will influence
both design and evaluation of the command and control systems
that support tactical decision making by such commanders and
their staffs, over long periods, in hostile environments under
extreme stress.
1. THE IMPORTANCE TO MIS OF COGNITIVE benefits including better communication
DECISION RESEARCH with clients, the designers did not
achieve their primary objective: shifting
The psychological study of managerial the orientation of security analysts from
decisionmaking is essential in the design individual securities to overall portfolio
and evaluation of many information management. Drawing on Stabell's analysis
systems. A growing tradition of of such experiences, Keen and Scott Morton
psychological research in MIS demonstrates warn DSS designers not to make commitments
its importance to investigators. for significant cost savings or other
According to Keen and Scott Morton (3), it objectively measurable achievements. It
is fundamental to the design of Decision is much too riskyl
Support Systems (DSS); Schneidewind (1980,
personal communication) and others argue Partly because DSS's are chancy, users
for the study of human problem solving are middle managers, not executives.
processes in other MIS areas. Also, in comparison with large traditional
Nonetheless, some of the best known DSS's data processing systems, DSS's are
(1,2,4,5) are not based on extensive invariably smaller, less sophisticated,
formal research on managerial decision and much less expensive: modest projects
making behavior. Their roots are minimize the inherent risks in poorly
frequently in normative theories developed understood processes.
by microeconomics, finance, or other
disciplines; alternatively, systems maygain recognition by exploiting new 2. TRACING EXECUTIVE DECISIONMAKING
computer technology in clever, innovative PROCESSES WITH VISUAL MENTAL IMAGERYways. In the development of more PROTOCOLS
conventional information systems,
behavioral decision research is even less Since computer decision aids areinfluential. difficult to implement, designers shouldcare fully study the underlying managerialThis inattention to the managerial processes. In fact, they do; but theirdecisionmaking process has unfortunate analyses are fraught with methodologicalconsequences. Although Stabell (6) found dangers. Clearly, such cognitive decisionthat implementations of portfolio research requires new techniques.management systems provided important
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2.1 THE LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING METHODS others. It has the function of a model
that decisionmakers build and manipulate.Unless the decision tasks are very
simple, descriptive efforts by economists For high imagery tasks, subjects can
and psychologists are rarely successful. report thought processes by drawing
Studies 'in the paradigm of sequences of mental images that they
information-processing psychology are the experience. This protocol technique is
principal exceptions: subjects solve especially appropriate for images that do
complex problems, while verbally not tax subjects' drawing abilities, for
describing their step-by-step solution spatial problems whose usual solutionprocedures. Researchers then develop methods involve sketching, drawing, or
simulations which they compare with graphing, and finally, for abstract tasks
transcriptions of the tape recorded verbal solved by manipulation of mental models.protocols. While these computer models These conditions place clear limits on
are often useful to systems analysts, they applications for mental imagery protocols.
present several limitations. For one Under the appropriate circumstances,
thing, the theories are sufficient however, they are enormously useful.explanations, but cannot preclude
alternative hypotheses. The major 2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROTOCOL
objection, however, is that simulations METHODOLOGIES FOR VISUAL MENTAL IMAGERYtake too long to program. As a
consequence, information processing Baylor and Moran report simulations of
theories typically describe a few subjects human problem solving or tasks for which:
on two or three variations of a single
task. a) visual mental imagery is essental, and
Ideally, applications to MIS require b) subjects can verbally describe their
large samples, because of potentially problem solving operations.important individual differences in
decisionmaking styles. Also, systems must For example, Baylor's subjects give
support many related problems that differ step-by-step protocols of visual imagesin parameter values, or structure. For they require to mentally cut a cube into
example, a system for budget decisions twenty-seven smaller elements. Moran's
must cover a wide range of allocations, or simulations describe how his subject
even application domains with different learns mental paths for which directions
structures. Executive problem solving are north (N), south (S), east (E), or
makes great demands on decision analysts west (W), and all distances are of unit
and DSS designers. It requires support length. (Thus N,E,N,E,N, E represents a
systems for a large set of nearly step-like path)
intractible tasks.
In extending these protocol
2.2 THE ADVANTAGES OF MENTAL IMAGERY methodologies, Weissinger-Baylon (7)
PROTOCOLS analyzes less structured tasks. He
investigates problem solving where:Investigations of complex processes
require so much data that appropriate a) mental imagery is useful, but not
techniques must summarize them to always necessary, and
facilitate interpretation. Psychological
evidence demonstrates the power of b) imagery operations are easier to draw
drawings or other graphic forms of than describe verbally.
information. For example, subjects who
briefly examine a thousand photographs can While the subjects of Baylor and Moranidentify them later with few errors. verbally describe their problem solving,
Also, professional mnemonists often use Weissinger-Baylon's protocols are
mental imagery to perform their astounding step-by-step reports that include both
memory feats. drawings of mental images and verbal
descriptions. Although most earlier work
In earlier work with Edward in this tradition is based on very small
Feigenbaum, Roger Shepard, Patrick Suppes, samples, he uses Markov models to analyze
and David Thompson at Stanford, thirty-seven subjects on fourteen tasks.
Weissinger-Baylon (7) developed techniques Consequently, this is an important step
for externalizing the sequences of mental toward a methodology for an'alyzing
imagery experienced during the solution of executive decisionmaking.scientific problems. They found enormous
variation in imagery reports across
subjects and tasks. However, this study 3. ANALYSIS OF DECISIONMAKING BY A HIGH
demonstrated that mental imagery is not an LEVEL EXECUTIVE: THE COMMANDER OF A NAVALepiphenomenon as claimed by Pylyshyn and TASK FORCE
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Our study applies mental imagery While solving the problem, subjectstechniques to analyze decisionmaking by a report their visual mental imagery by
naval task force commander, a top level drawing it. Protocols are tape recordedmanager. It will influence the design and for subsequent transcription and analysis.
evaluation of command and control systems. At the end of the session, they provide
In order to obtain imagery protocols, we written summaries of their solutionare conducting laboratory investigations procedure. The experimenter continuouslywith wargaming and simulation facilities monitors problem solving, and answersof the Advanced Command and Control Test appropriate questions using a modified
Bed at the Naval Postgraduate School. The directed interaction technique. Itexperimental task requires subjects to prescribes for specific situations the
make decisions as commanders of a task questions he should ask and'the responsesforce. Its main asset is a carrier with he should make to subjects' queries or
squadrons of attack, interceptor, behavior. The technique elicits talking,
anti-submarine helicopter and other imagery reports, and written summaries.aircraft. An inner screen of guided While limiting experimentet bias, the
missile cruisers and destroyers guards the method reduces difficulties in the
carrier against air or submarine threats. analysis stage that arise from inaccurate,
At greater distances, a cruiser, incomplete, or ambiguous protocols.
destroyers, and various carrier and land
based aircraft patrols have similar roles.
5. ANALYSIS
By any standards, these resources are Weissinger-Baylon (7,8) develops
substantial. The carrier's F-14 protocol elicitation and analysis
interceptor squadrons, for example, cost techniques for visual mental imagery.
nearly four hundred· million dollars; Application of these methods must first
certain ships are in the one to two address the anti-imagery arguments ofbillion dollar range. Logistics and other Pylyshyn, who describes mental images asnecessary support activities are much functionless by-products of thinking, or
larger than the battle group itself. epiphenomena. By operationally defining
Consequently, a deployed task force rivals "epiphenomenon" as stochastic independence
in sheer magnitude all non-government between mental imagery report and problem
organizations except the very largest solutions, Weissinger-Baylon (8)
international corporations. demonstrates that his data on abstractmathematical problem solving are
inconsistent with Pylyshyn's claims.
4. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES Errors in imagery and solutions are in
fact highly correlated.
Ten officer students and staff members
of the Naval Postgraduate School are If mental images have a function, what
subjects. All have tactical training; is it? This question has stubbornly
their relevant skills, however, range from resisted analysis for half a century. In
novice to expert. In rank, they vary from Weissinger-Baylon (7), a taxonomic study
lieutenant to lieutenant colonel or of mental images finally solves much of
commander. the long mystery. He describes imagery asa first order, discrete state, discrete
A video tape presentation by Capt. transition Markov model. Protocol data
Wayne Hughes describes the mission and provide estimates of the. transition
tactical situation of the battle group for probabilities, and permit categorization
which subjects assume the commander's of images as states. From this
role. In the experimental scenario, an classification, the function of images isantisubmarine patrol bomber monitors a now clear: they are mental models that
long linear barrier of sonar buoys to the subjects build, reconstruct, or retrieve
northeast. This aircraft detects and then from memory during problem solving.loses contact with an enemy nuclear Thinking, when analogue, involvessubmarine heading directly for the naval manipulation of these images or their
task force. The subject must prosecute an parts (by translation, rotation, flipping,attack before the submarine is in range to dilation, stretching, bending, twisting,
launch its missiles. His suggested or by other linear and nonlinear
options are to use the patrol bomber, transformations).
launch from the carrier an additionalpatrol aircraft of the same type, send 5.1 MENTAL IMAGERY PROTOCOLS OF TASK FORCE
another antisubmarine aircraft currently COMMANDERS
on patrol to the south, send helicopters
from either the carrier or a destroyer, Experience in antisubmarine warfare issend a destroyer or submarine. the major individual difference among our
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subjects. The imagery of Figure 1 is for images, tracing step-by-step his problem
a participant without specialized solving procedure. First, (see Figure 2)
training; Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 are from a he places a linear buoy barrier halfway
subject with several years of relevant between the task force and submarine
experience. For both subjects, we present threat.
imagery reports only. However, we
summarize their verbal descriptions below
each figure. Because some distance
information is confidential, the graphs
are not to scale. In at least one S.
important respect, these reports are '0,
artificial: our subjects prosecute the
attack at all decision levels; in
practice, however, the overall commander
has the assistance of a large staff and
Bl
subordinate commanders; he is less
involved than our subjects in details of B2execution.
Protocol One: an Untrained Subject
TF OFor one subject without antisubmarine
warfare experience, the imagery in Figure Figure 2. Image 1 for a Trained Subject
1 summarizes his decisions: a field of
sonar buoys, and deployment of a A barrier (Bl) of sonar buoys protects
submarine, destroyer, and F14 aircraft. the task force (TF) against enemy
This behavior is representative of submarines such as S, which Bl detected as
participants with similar training. it crossed. Our subject initially plans asecond linear barrier (82) about halfway
between S and TF. At this point in his
F14 decisionmaking, he believes that S is
i \ within approximately ten nautical miles ofS TF.
B1 After discovering a large error in his
interpretation of scale, this participant
abandons his linear barrier plan.
Instead, he proposes a wedge (Figure 3)
near the lastenemy submarine contact.
SSN
DD
TF
Figure 1. Imagery Protocol for an \ S\
Untrained Subject.  0081
B2The circle (TF) is the carrier and itsinner screen. A linear sonar buoy barrier
(Bl) is 100 nautical miles to the
northeast. An enemy nuclear submarine (S)
penetrates the screen. The subject's
responses are to send a destroyer (DD) inthe direction of the threat, send a
submarine (SSN), and send an interceptor TF 0aircraft (F14). He also lays a sonar buoyfield (F) in the area of last contact with Figure 3. Image 2 for a Trained Subjectthe enemy submarine. For simplicity, we
omit the sequence of S's decisions. After noticing an error in his
interpretation of scale, this subjectrealizes that enemy submarine (S) isProtocol Two: a Trained Subject approximately 100 nautical miles from the
task force (TF). He now plans aIn the figures below, a trained wedge-shaped sonar buoy barrier (B2) in
subject presents a sequence of mental S's path.
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The submarine will not pass the wedge 5.2 ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN
in much less than an hour. Consequently, TRAININGthe patrol aircraft will "walk back" to it
by dropping additional buoys. Figure 4 The protocols above are reasonablyreports this mental image. representative of behavior by subjects
with similar training. They suggest that
experts may sometimes use techniques
unknown to others. An example is a sonar
buoy wedge pattern. Also, experienced
decisionmakers seem to use resources more
conservatively.
subjects, Table 1 extracts the key1.. \131
From the graphic protocols of ten
B2 solution elements. It compares thesedecisions according to participants'
training in antisubmarine warfare,
generally confirming the observations
already suggested by direct exanmination
of representative protocols. Thus, thewedge is conservative of sonar buoys
relative to very long linear barriers;
< trained subjects always use it, others
TF never. Similar observations apply to bothships and aircrft: thus, no expert sends a
Figure 4. Image 3 for a Trained Subject. destroyer; only one deploys a submarine.
For nonexperts, however, both rates are
After laying the wedge barrier (B2), seventy percent.
the patrol aircraft will "walk back"
toward enemy submarine S by dropping
additional buoys. Their approximate 6. CONCLUSION: VISUAL MENTAL IMAGERY
positions are shown by the five points PROTOCOLS FACILITATE THE ANALYSIS OP
inside B2. EXECUTIVE DECISIONMAKING
Eventually, our work will yield a
The final step is a detailed plan for specification of information requirements,
walking back: a smaller wedge inside the based on an understanding of the cognitive
first barrier (see Figure 5). processes, communications, and group
interactions of senior managers who
participate in high level decisionmaking.
With rare exceptions, however,
decisionmaking studies have no direct
influence on systems design; this work is
necessarily exploratory. To achieve our
goals, we need a continuing research
program.
For the moment, our emphasis must be\\S \ Bl on developing suitable methods for tracing L B ji executives' complex problem solving
-2 processes: mental imagery protocols are a
good bet. Our initial results, while
extremely tentative, illustrate the
potential usefulness of that methodology.
Later on, much larger samples will permit
a more penetrating analysis in terms of
many factors that still await discovery.
Individual differences in abilities,
TF 0 professional training and orientation,decisionmaking style, and responses to
Figure· 5. Image 4 for a Trained Subject. time pressure and other sources of stress
are a few of the candidates. structures
This image represents the subjects of problems may also be important; for
final plan. After laying wedge B2, he specific tasks, we will investigate their
Will walk back toward enemy ·submarine S by influence on information requirements.
laying a second, smaller wedge (B3).
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Imagery protocols offer a powerful 4. Little, J.D.C. Models and managers:
technique for the study of decisionmaking. the concept of a decision calculus.
In his database research, for example, Management Science, 16, 8, (April 1970).Hoffer (1980, personal communication) iscollecting and analyzing managers' images. 5. Little, J.D.C. Brandaid. Operations
Obviously, they are most useful for high Research, 23, 4, (May 1975).
imagery tasks and subjects. One potential
consequence is intriguing: of all 6. Stabell, C.B. Individual Differences
executive problem solving and in Managerial Decision Making Processes:
decisionmaking processes, those that A Study of Conversational Computer Usage.
depend on visual mental imagery may be the Ph.D. Dissertation, M.I.T., (1974).
first that we will understand well.
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Untrained Trained
Subjects Subjects
(N=7) (N=3)
Aircraft:
Patrol bomber (5-3) 15 67
Ilelicopters (511-3H, LAMPS) 30 0
Inlerceptor (F-14) 30 0
Sh.123:
Destroyer 70 0
Sub,iarine 70 33
Carrier (withdrawal) 0 100
So no_bupy. Jia r.r i ft·_S :
Wedge 0 100Linear 70 0Field 30 0
Table 1. Effect of Training on Solutions.
Principal eletilents of solutions by ten subjects appear
in the left column. These involve deploying aircraftor ships and laying sonobuoy patterns. For each solu-
tion type, the center column gives the percentage of
untrained subjects choosing it. In the right column
are corresponding figures for three subjects with someprior exposure to antisubmaritie techniques.
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